Lack of evidence for zoonotic transmission of Schmallenberg virus by Reusken, C. et al.
The emergence of Schmallenberg virus (SBV), a 
novel orthobunyavirus, in ruminants in Europe triggered a 
joint veterinary and public health response to address the 
possible consequences to human health. Use of a risk 
profi ling algorithm enabled the conclusion that the risk 
for zoonotic transmission of SBV could not be excluded 
completely. Self-reported health problems were monitored, 
and a serologic study was initiated among persons living 
and/or working on SBV-affected farms. In the study set-up, 
we addressed the vector and direct transmission routes 
for putative zoonotic transfer. In total, 69 sheep farms, 4 
goat farms, and 50 cattle farms were included. No evidence 
for SBV-neutralizing antibodies was found in serum of 301 
participants. The lack of evidence for zoonotic transmission 
from either syndromic illness monitoring or serologic testing 
of presumably highly exposed persons suggests that the 
public health risk for SBV, given the current situation, is 
absent or extremely low.
In November 2011, scientists in Germany identifi ed novel viral sequences in serum from cattle affected by a febrile 
syndrome that was reported during August–September 2011 
in Germany and the Netherlands. Clinical signs included 
decreased milk production and diarrhea. The virus, named 
Schmallenberg virus (SBV), was isolated from blood of 
affected cattle, and similar clinical manifestations were 
observed in experimentally infected calves (1). In the 
Netherlands, SBV was detected retrospectively in serum 
from affected cattle in December 2011 (2).
Since the end of November 2011, an unusually high 
number of ovine and bovine congenital malformations were 
reported in the Netherlands. The main macroscopic fi ndings 
included arthrogryposis; torticollis; scoliosis; brachygnathia 
inferior; hydranencephaly; and hypoplasia of cerebrum, 
cerebellum, and spinal cord. SBV genome was detected in the 
brain of malformed lambs and calves (3–5). These fi ndings, 
together with detection of SBV RNA in multiple types of 
samples, e.g., amniotic fl uid, meconium, and placenta 
remains from diseased lambs and calves, strongly pointed 
to SBV as the causative agent of the clinical manifestations 
(6). The teratogenic effects in ruminants are hypothesized to 
refl ect virus circulation in late summer/early autumn 2011, 
leading to intrauterine infection with SBV during a specifi c 
period of gestation (4).
In June 2012, seven additional European countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom) confi rmed SBV in ruminants, 
accumulating to a total of 3,745 PCR-confi rmed infected 
animal holdings (4,7). In the Netherlands 1,670 holdings 
were suspected to be affected by SBV on the basis of births 
of animals with malformations typical of SBV infection, 
of which 350 were confi rmed by PCR as of June 12, 2012. 
The holdings with confi rmed SBV comprise 237 cattle, 107 
sheep, and 6 goat farms (8).
SBV has been identifi ed as most related to Sathuperi 
virus, and for the small and large segments, Shamonda 
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Lack of Evidence for Zoonotic SBV
virus segments show the highest sequence identity. All 
those viruses are members of the Simbu serogroup, family 
Bunyaviridae, genus Orthobunyavirus, and known as 
arthropod-borne viruses that can cause illness in ruminants 
(9). The orthobunyaviruses comprise ≈170 virus isolates, 
assigned to 48 distinct species, arranged in 18 serogroups, 
including the Simbu serogroup. Serogroups within the 
genus are based on cross–hemagglutination-inhibition 
and antibody neutralization relationships. Phylogenetic 
relationships are consistent with the results of serologic 
relationships (10–12).
Because the family Bunyaviridae contains several 
medically relevant zoonotic viruses, of which Crimean-
Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, Rift Valley fever virus, Sin 
Nombre virus, and sandfl y fever Naples virus are examples, 
the emergence of SBV triggered a joint veterinary and 
public health response in the Netherlands to address the 
possible consequences to human health. We present the 
public health risk ascertainment of the emergence of SBV 
in ruminants in the Netherlands and most likely other 
European countries were SBV has emerged.
Methods
Profi ling Risks to Humans
We used a standard in-house checklist for profi ling the 
risk to human health of novel emerging viruses to assess 
the public health risks for SBV. This checklist comprised 
10 items: 1) situation assessment; 2) review of taxonomic 
position of the newly identifi ed virus; 3) review of human 
health risks associated with closely related viruses; 4) 
review of epidemiology of related viruses (transmission 
cycle, reservoirs, and vectors); 5) review of clinical 
manifestations in humans of related viruses (including 
kinetics of immune response and shedding); 6) assessment 
of potential for human exposure and identifi cation of 
related risk factors; 7) assessment of human diagnostics; 8) 
design of a literature/evidence-based testing algorithm; and 
10) conclusions and recommendations.
Virus and Validation Serum
An SBV strain, isolated from SBV reverse transcription 
PCR–positive, homogenized brain tissue of a malformed 
lamb in the Netherlands, was obtained from the Central 
Veterinary Institute (Lelystad, the Netherlands). Putative 
cross-reacting orthobunyaviruses circulating in Europe, 
Batai virus (13), Tahyna virus (14), and Inkoo virus (15), 
were obtained from the Bernhard Nocht Institute for 
Tropical Medicine (Hamburg, Germany). All viruses were 
propagated and titrated (50% tissue culture infectious dose 
[TCID50]) in continuous African green monkey kidney cells 
(Vero E6, ATCC CRL-1586). SBV-positive control serum 
from a ewe that had given birth to an SBV PCR-positive 
lamb was obtained from the Animal Health Service (AHS), 
and positive serum sample from an experimentally infected 
ewe was obtained from the Central Veterinary Institute.
Well-defi ned negative and positive human serum 
cohorts were not available because SBV is a novel emerging 
virus with unknown zoonotic potential. Therefore, we 
validated the virus neutralization test (VNT) using presumed 
seronegative serum from 1) 56 patients without travel 
history submitted to the National Institute for Public Health 
and the Environment during February 28, 2007–February 
25, 2008, for routine diagnostic testing for Bordetella 
pertussis; 2) 73 inhabitants of municipalities with known 
SBV activity in 2011 that had been collected during August 
15, 2010–October 15, 2010, for routine screening; and 3) 
93 veterinary students collected in 2006 and 2008. Serum 
from 92 veterinary students sampled during 2011 and from 
73 inhabitants of municipalities with known SBV activity 
collected during August 15, 2011–October 15, 2011, for 
routine screening were considered to represent community 
samples from possibly exposed populations and were added 
to the validation panel. Anonymized use of serum from the 
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment 
was covered by the rules of the code of conduct for proper 
use of human tissue of the Dutch Federation of Medical 
Scientifi c Associations. The cohort study of the veterinary 
students included screening for zoonotic infections and 
was approved by the Medical Ethical Committee of the 
University Medical Centre Utrecht.
VNT
For VNT, Vero E6 cells were seeded in 96-well plates 
and incubated overnight at 37°C with 5% CO2 until the 
cells were ≈80%–90% confl uent. Serum was heated for 30 
min at 56°C to inactivate complement before use. Serum 
was serially diluted in 2-fold steps in minimum essential 
medium (GIBCO/Life Technologies, Bleiswijk, the 
Netherlands). We added 100 TCID50 of virus to the diluted 
serum (volume of 60 μL each). To rule out the presence 
of other cytopathic effect–inducing factors, serum dilutions 
also were added to control wells to which no virus was 
added. After incubation at 37°C in 5% CO2 for 1 h, 100 μL 
of the virus-plus-serum mixture, no virus-serum controls, 
and a virus dilution control were added to the Vero E6 cells 
and incubated for 3 d at 37°C. Assays were performed in 
duplicate. Cells were monitored for cytopathic effect after 
3 days.
Monitoring of Health Symptoms
Persons in close contact with affected animals or their 
birth materials in whom fever developed (>38°C) within 
2 weeks after exposure were asked to contact the regional 
public health service (PHS) for evaluation and assessment 
of the need for follow-up. This request was made through 
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an email-based alert system hosted by the AHS and farmers 
association to veterinarians. The alert system prompted 
veterinarians to inform farmers on SBV-affected holdings. 
When a relation between reported fever and SBV was 
considered possible, a short questionnaire was fi lled in by 
study participants, and serum was tested by real-time PCR 
(as described in [6]) and VNT to diagnose a possible SBV 
infection.
Design of Serologic Study in Persons 
with High Probability of Exposure
A serologic survey was designed to determine the 
presence of SBV antibodies in serum from persons 
living and working on farms where SBV had been highly 
suspected on the basis of pathologic fi ndings consistent 
with typical SBV-induced malformations in calves or 
lambs, most confi rmed by PCR and/or serology. The target 
cohort, consisting of adult (>18 years of age) farmers, farm 
residents, farm employees, and veterinarians who had been 
exposed to affected herds, were invited to participate by 
donating a serum sample and fi lling in a questionnaire. 
A total of 240 affected animal holdings were approached 
through direct mailing by the AHS. Employees of the 
regional PHS visited the affected farms and collected 
serum samples and questionnaires. The veterinarians 
were collectively contacted to be sampled at a national 
conference after a preannouncement of the purpose of the 
study.
The questionnaire addressed demographics, the animal 
species involved, the type and level of exposure (birth 
materials, feces, milk or other products, insects), protective 
equipment used during work, general health, (recent) 
health complaints, and presence of wounds on hands. The 
study protocol, information material, and questionnaires 
were assessed by the Medical Ethical Committee of the 
University Medical Centre Utrecht and approved (METC 
no. 12–106).
On the basis of a literature review of seroprevalence 
studies in regions with known orthobunyavirus outbreaks, 
a seroprevalence of 2% was established as the lower bound 
in an affected human population (N. Cleton, unpub. data; 
16–19). In this scenario with 2% seroprevalence, testing of, 
for example, 200 exposed persons would give a probability 
of 98.24% to detect >1 seropositive persons (Table 1).
Results
Profi ling the Human Risks for SBV
Human Disease in Related Viruses
The literature indicates that zoonotic transmission 
of SBV could not be completely ruled out. The 
taxonomic position of SBV had been identifi ed as family 
Bunyaviridae, genus Orthobunyavirus, Simbu serogroup 
(1). At least 30 orthobunyaviruses have been associated 
with human disease. Virologic or serologic evidence 
for zoonotic infection has been found for several viruses 
within the Simbu serogroup, including viruses considered 
to be primarily livestock pathogens (Aino and Shuni virus; 
Table 2). Among the many reasons for vigilance was the 
lack of full characterization of SBV. Genetic reassortment 
between orthobunyaviruses within the same serogroups 
has led to emergence of new viruses, occasionally with 
increased pathogenicity and potentially with changes in 
host range (21,36–40).
Modes of Transmission
The related Shamonda, Sathuperi, Aino, and Akabane 
viruses are transmitted mainly by biting midges (23; 41 in 
online Technical Appendix, wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/pdfs/12-
0560-Techapp.pdf), and the epidemiology of the infection 
in animals and the fi rst detections of SBV genome in 
Culicoides spp. midges in Belgium, Denmark, and Italy 
suggested vector-borne spread as a mode of transmission for 
SBV as well (1,2; 42–44 in online Technical Appendix). In 
addition, the birth defects in lambs and calves increased the 
need for assistance from veterinarians during parturition, 
and high loads of viral RNA were detected in birth materials 
of sheep and cattle (6). Therefore, if SBV is zoonotic, 
transmission could have occurred to persons who could 
have been exposed to infected vectors (residents, farmers, 
veterinarians) and/or through direct contact with animals 
that had congenital malformations or with birth material, 
e.g., during assistance at deliveries (farmers, veterinarians). 
A testing algorithm was designed (Figure). Professionals 
were advised to respect common hygiene measures for 
veterinarian-assisted deliveries and handling of affected 
newborn ruminants. Pregnant women were advised not to 
assist at ruminant deliveries.
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Table 1. Probability of detecting at least 1 seropositive sample 
among different sample sizes and hypothetical seroprevalences 
in study to determine whether Schmallenberg virus can be 
zoonotically transmitted, the Netherlands 
Sample size
Hypothetical 
seroprevalence, %
Probability* of detecting 
at least 1 seropositive, %
50 2.00 63.58
100 2.00 86.74
150 2.00 95.17 
192 2.00 97.93 
200 2.00 98.24
301 2.00 99.77
301 1.00 95.14
301 0.50 77.88
301 0.25 52.93
301 3.00 99.99
*The probability was calculated as 1 – (1 – seroprevalence) ˆ sample size, 
so for a seroprevalence of 2% and a sample size of 200, the probability of 
detecting at least 1 seropositive = 1 – (1 – 0.02) ˆ 200. 
Lack of Evidence for Zoonotic SBV
Validation of VNT
Because the viremic phase in orthobunyavirus 
infections typically is short, we chose to use serologic 
testing by VNT to evaluate an immunologic response in 
exposed persons (1,21). For assay validation, possible 
cross-reacting zoonotic viruses circulating in Europe were 
identifi ed. Zoonotic viruses in the Simbu serogroup are not 
known to circulate in Europe, but related orthobunyaviruses 
that may infect humans are Batai virus (BATV), Tahyna 
virus (TAHV), and Inkoo virus (INKV) (Table 2). No 
cross-neutralization was observed when the SBV-positive 
control serum was tested against 100 TCID50 of BATV, 
INKV, and TAHV, whereas the homologous titer was 
512 (data not shown). The reverse experiment could not 
be conducted because of a lack of reference reagents. A 
control cohort of 222 serum samples, presumed negative on 
the basis of collection data before 2011, were all negative 
in the VNT (data not shown). Another validation cohort 
of 165 serum samples, possibly positive on the basis of 
collection data in 2011 and putative exposure through 
residence and professional activities, were all negative as 
well (data not shown).
Monitoring of Symptoms
Symptoms that could be attributed to a putative 
infection with SBV were determined on the basis of an 
inventory made of syndromes related to human infection 
with closely related viruses of the Simbu group, i.e., 
Oropouche virus and Iquitos virus (Table 2). These viruses 
typically cause a febrile illness accompanied by chills, 
general malaise, headache, anorexia, muscle and joint pain, 
muscle weakness, and vomiting. Symptoms of meningitis 
or a rash occasionally develop. The reported diseases 
generally are self-limiting (20,21).
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 18, No. 11, November 2012 1749
Table 2. Evidence for zoonotic infection within the family Bunyaviridae, Orthobunyavirus genus, the Netherlands* 
Serogroup, species 
Geographic 
distribution Reservoir 
Human
infection Evidence 
Reported 
symptoms in 
humans
Congenital
disease in 
humans References
Simbu        
 Oropouche virus South America Humans, 
sloths,
marmosets
Yes Outbreaks Febrile illness, 
arthralgia, 
diarrhea 
NR (18,20)
 Iquitos virus South America Humans, 
unknown 
Yes Unexplained 
fever
surveillance 
Febrile illness, 
arthralgia, 
diarrhea 
NR (21)
 Akabane virus Asia, Israel, 
Kenya, 
Australia 
Cattle,
horses, 
sheep
No No serology NR NR (22,23)
 Shamonda virus Africa Cattle No No serology NR NR (24,25)
 Aino virus Asia Cattle Possibly Serology Unknown Unknown (22,23,26)
 Shuni virus Africa Cattle, 
horses, 
sheep
Possibly Virus isolation 
(one case) 
Fever, no 
hospital
submission 
NR (27–29)
 Sathuperi virus Asia, Africa Cattle Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown (30)
California encephalitis        
 California encephalitis 
 virus 
North America Rodents, 
lagomorphs 
Yes Endemic, 
common
Febrile illness, 
encephalitis
NR (31)
 La Crosse virus North America Rodents, 
lagomorphs 
Yes Endemic 
common
Febrile illness, 
encephalitis
NR (31)
 Tahyna virus Europe, Asia, 
Africa
Lagomorphs, 
rodents,
hedgehogs 
Yes Serology, 
cases 
Febrile illness, 
respiratory 
symptoms 
meningitis (mild) 
NR (32)
 Inkoo virus Northern 
Europe 
Lagomorphs Yes Surveillance 
febrile illness, 
CNS illness, 
Febrile illness, 
Meningitis (mild) 
NR (32)
 Snowshoe hare virus North America, 
Far-Eastern 
Europe 
Lagomorphs, 
rodents 
Yes Serology, 
case reports 
Febrile illness NR (32)
(31)
Bunyamwera        
 Batai virus Europe, Asia, 
Africa
Birds,pigs,
horses, 
ruminants
Yes Serology 
(rare) 
Febrile illness, 
affection
NR (32)
 Cache Valley virus North America Deer, sheep, 
horses, cattle
Yes 2 Case 
reports,
serology 
Febrile illness, 
encephalitis
Under
discussion 
(33–35)
 Ngari virus Africa Humans, 
unknown 
Yes Outbreaks, 
virus isolation 
Febrile illness, 
hemorragic fever 
NR (36–38)
*NR, not reported; CNS, central nervous system. 
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Because the range of symptoms described was 
diverse, we decided to monitor patients who suited our 
case defi nition: febrile disease >38°C within 2 weeks after 
contact with malformed calves or lambs or their birthing 
materials (in the absence of the supposed vector during 
the winter season). The 2-week period was based on the 
known incubation period for Oropouche virus in humans, 
typically 4–8 days (20). Eight cases were reported by the 
PHS during January 1–April 15, 2012. Four of these were 
excluded because they did not meet the case defi nition. 
The remaining 4 cases were tested by PCR and VNT (for 
3 cases only because only vesicle fl uid was available for 
1 study participant). None of the tested suspected case-
persons showed evidence of an SBV infection.
In addition, no unusual trends were noted during or 
since summer 2011 in the existing routine surveillances for 
neurologic illness, gastroenteritis, and infl uenza-like illness 
at the Netherlands Centre for Infectious Disease Control 
(H. van der Avoort, E. Duizer, and A. Meijer, pers. comm.).
Serology in High-Exposure Groups
To enable evidence-based risk profi ling, serologic 
surveillance was initiated in persons residing at locations 
with proven SBV circulation and professionals in close 
contact with infected animals and their birth materials. In 
this study set-up, we addressed the vector and the direct 
transmission routes for putative zoonotic transfer.
The study comprised 301 participants. Of these, 192 
worked or lived on farms with laboratory-confi rmed SBV 
circulation in animals, 42 persons worked or lived on farms 
where animals were being raised and where SBV infection 
was highly suspected, and 67 were veterinarians who had 
been in contact with malformed animals (Tables 3, 4). These 
123 farms consisted of 69 sheep, 4 goat, and 50 cattle farms 
that had animals with typical SBV malformations (no other 
pathogens were circulating in the Netherlands that cause 
congenital malformations, including arthrogryposis), of 
which most were PCR and/or VNT confi rmed (83%; Table 
4). SBV-specifi c antibodies were detected in livestock 
serum at 97.7% (83/85) of the farms for which serum was 
available (Table 4). Overall, 229 participants specifi cally 
reported direct exposure to newborn calves, lambs, and/or 
birth materials from SBV-infected herds; these participants 
comprised 179 farmers, and 50 veterinarians (39 of whom 
were exposed while assisting with deliveries at farms and 
11 during postmortem examination of malformed newborns 
at the AHS). A total of 150 participants reported insect 
bites on SBV-infected farm(s), exposing them potentially 
to SBV during the vector season (Table 3).
None of the 301 participants showed serologic 
evidence of SBV infection in the VNT, whereas a titer 
of neutralizing antibodies was high in the ovine control 
serum. In a scenario of 2% seroprevalence, testing of 
301 persons would have led to a probability of 99.77% 
to detect >1 seropositive persons (97.93% on the basis of 
192 persons with laboratory-confi rmed exposure; Table 
1). Nevertheless, sporadic infections cannot be excluded 
entirely.
Discussion
The Netherlands has an integrated structure for human–
animal risk analysis and response to zoonoses, established 
after the massive Q fever outbreak in 2007–2010. The 
continuous emergence of zoonotic viruses from livestock 
reservoirs, with examples of Nipah virus, Japanese 
encephalitis virus, highly pathogenic avian infl uenza 
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Figure. Testing algorithm to determine whether 
Schmallenberg virus can be zoonotically 
transmitted, the Netherlands. RT-PCR, reverse 
transcription PCR.
Lack of Evidence for Zoonotic SBV
A (H7N7) and A (H5N1) viruses, and coronaviruses, 
underscores the relevance of the One Health approach 
in assessing the risks for novel emerging pathogens, 
such as SBV (45–49 in online Technical Appendix). 
The emergence of SBV in 2011 was a test case for this 
collaborative approach to risk assessment. Information, 
protocols, and samples were shared rapidly, facilitating a 
quick public health response.
On the basis of the fi ndings of an in-house risk-
assessment algorithm, we concluded that zoonotic 
transmission of the virus could not be excluded, triggering 
the study described here. We found no evidence for 
infection by serology, but ruling out zoonotic infections 
with high certainty is not simple, particularly in a complex 
situation with >1 possible mode of transmission.
If zoonotic, transmission of SBV could have occurred 
through vector-borne transmission during the period of 
high vector density in summer and fall 2011. The level 
of exposure to SBV by arthropods depends on the vector 
capacity of the residing vectors. Vector capacity is a measure 
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Table 3. Main characteristics of study participants* in study to determine whether SBV can be zoonotically transmitted, the 
Netherlands* 
Exposure group, risk factor Exposed Participants, no. (%)/additional information 
All 
 Total  301/age 18–88 y; mean 47 y; 25th–75th 
percentile 36–58 y; 62% male 
 Exposure to biting insects on SBV-infected farm(s) Yes 150 (50) 
No 71 (24) 
 Unknown 80 (26) 
Farmers, total  234 
 Working and living on SBV-infected farm  191 (82) 
 Working on SBV-infected farm  26 (11) 
 Living on SBV-infected farm  15 (6) 
 Unknown  2 (1) 
 Exposure to animals   
  Sheep   
   Regular contact with lambs and/or birth products on  
   SBV-infected farm 
Yes 110, of whom 88 reported hand (skin) injuries 
during work 
No 31 
   Total  141 
  Goats   
   Regular contact with kids and/or birth products on  
   SBV-infected farm 
Yes 3, of whom 3 reported regular hand (skin) 
injuries during work 
No 10 
   Total  13 
  Cattle   
   Regular contact with calves and/or birth products on  
   SBV-infected farm 
Yes 90, of whom 72 reported regular (hand) skin 
injuries during work 
No 38 
   Total  128 
Veterinarians   
 Total  67/1–50 SBV-infected farms visited per 
veterinarian; median 4 
 Exposure to animals   
  Sheep   
   Contact with malformed lambs and/or birth products Yes† 19, of whom 18 reported regular hand (skin) 
injuries during work 
No 29 
   Total  48 
  Goats   
   Contact with malformed lambs and/or birth products Yes† 1 who reported regular hand (skin) injuries 
during work 
No 29 
   Total  30 
  Cattle   
   Contact with malformed calves and/or birth products Yes† 33, of whom 28 reported regular hand (skin) 
injuries during work 
No 20 
   Total  53 
 Contact with malformed lambs/calves during section at  
 Animal Health Service 
Yes 11, of whom 6 reported regular hand (skin) 
injuries during work. 
*Overall, 50 (75%) of 67 veterinarians reported contact with malformed lambs/calves and/or birth products of which 40 reported regular hand (skin) 
injuries during work. Overall, 179 (76%) of 234 farmers, farm residents and farm employees reported regular contact with newborn lambs/calves and/or 
birth products on SBV-infected farms, of which 140 reported regular hand (skin) injuries during work. SBV, Schmallenburg virus.
†All tested seronegative. 
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of the effi ciency of vector-borne disease transmission 
comprising vector competence, susceptible host density, 
vector host feeding preferences, vector survival rate, vector 
density, and vector feeding rates (50 in online Technical 
Appendix). In this study, we found no evidence for human 
SBV infection, despite the high infection rate of sheep 
and cattle in the same localities (up to 100% within-herd 
seroprevalence (51 in online Technical Appendix) and the 
high level of reported insect bites during work on SBV-
infected farms. From the high infection rates in ruminants, 
we conclude that the capacity of residing vectors to transmit 
SBV to cattle and sheep was high, indicating that vector-
competence, vector densities, and vector survival rates were 
suffi cient for SBV transmission. Therefore, the absence of 
SBV antibodies in humans implies that humans are not 
susceptible to SBV infection but only under the assumption 
that the vectors of SBV have host feeding preference for 
humans. Research into the host preferences of identifi ed 
SBV vector species and, if proven anthropophilic, their 
feeding rates could clarify this issue.
If vector transmission would have been a route for 
zoonotic transmission leading to 2% seroprevalence in 
exposed persons, i.e., persons reporting insect bites on SBV-
infected farms, in this study the probability of detecting 
at least 1 of such seropositive persons would have been 
99.77%. However, this calculation is based on an assumed 
test specifi city and sensitivity of 100%. A high specifi city 
was justifi ed on the basis of the negative results with the 
387 control serum and the absence of neutralizing capacity 
of an SBV-positive ovine serum sample to INKV, BATV, 
and TAHV. Because SBV is a novel pathogen, no well-
defi ned seropositive human serum cohorts were available 
to assay the analytical sensitivity of our test. However, even 
with sensitivity as low as 90%, the probability of detecting 
at least 1 seropositive person still would have been 99.69% 
(data not shown).
The second possible exposure could occur through 
contact with affected animals and/or birth materials. The 
congenital malformations in lambs and calves with SBV 
infection are such that increased assistance during delivery 
was needed from farmers and veterinarians. Direct exposure 
to newborn ruminants and/or birth materials was reported 
in 76% of the study participants. If contact during delivery 
would have been an active route for zoonotic transmission, 
leading to 2% seroprevalence in exposed persons, the 
probability of detecting at least 1 of such seropositive 
persons would have been 99.02%.
A third option is that exposure to newborns and their 
birth materials has a higher risk for infection if exposed 
persons had blood contact with the affected materials (e.g., 
by hand wounds). Sixty percent of participants reported 
small wounds on hands; thus, the probability of detecting 
such seropositives would have been high (i.e., 97.37% with 
2% seroprevalence). In addition, 2 persons in the syndromic 
monitoring reported needlestick incidents, again without 
any evidence for infection through antibody testing.
The absence of evidence for direct transmission of SBV 
from ruminants to humans is in line with observations for 
other Simbu serogroup viruses (Akabane and Shamonda) 
infecting livestock (Table 2). Moreover, a serologic survey 
of 60 sheep farmers with sheep husbandry in the SBV 
epizootic area in Germany yielded no evidence for human 
SBV infection. However, of these farmers, only 48 had 
contact with lambs with SBV characteristic malformations, 
whereas SBV was laboratory confi rmed in the livestock of 
only 36 participants (52 in online Technical Appendix), 
but the level of exposure through contact with affected 
animals and/or birth material is diffi cult to quantify (4). In 
the Netherlands, SBV RNA has been detected in the brains 
of malformed animals on 18.6% of reported cattle farms 
and on 30.6% of reported sheep farms (8), and high loads 
of viral RNA have been detected in some placentas and in 
birth fl uids.
Current data suggest that infections might have been 
cleared by the time of delivery, particularly in cattle, which 
have longer gestations. Furthermore, fi nding RNA in birth 
materials does not give any information about the actual 
presence of infectious virus particles in these materials. 
Attempts to isolate viruses from such specimens have met 
with little success, and further research is needed to address 
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Table 4. Characteristics of participating farms and number of human participants in study to determine whether SBV can be 
zoonotically transmitted, the Netherlands* 
Animal
species†
No. farms (no. animals 
per farm [median])
Laboratory-confirmed SBV infection in 
animals, no. (%) No. human participants
PCR VNT
PCR and/or 
VNT
Total (no. per 
farm)
No. (%) from farms with laboratory-
confirmed SBV infection 
Sheep 69 (5–1,676 [83]) 48 (70) 44 (64) 61 (88)  130 (1–6) 112 (86)
Goat 4 (4–1144 [759]) 1 (25) 2 (50) 2 (50)  8 (1–4) 2 (25)
Cattle 50 (23–468 [136]) 4 (8) 37 (74) 39 (78)  96 (1–5) 78 (81)
Total 123 53 (43)‡ 83 (68)§ 102 (83)  234 192 (82)
*A total of 240 farms were invited to participate in the study (113 sheep, 7 goat, and 120 cattle farms; all were highly suspected to be SBV infected on the 
basis of pathologic findings consistent with typical malformations in calves or lambs). 123 (51%) farms responded. SBV, Schmallenburg virus; VNT, virus 
neutralization test. 
†Mixed farms were classified according to the main animal species. 
‡For 9 farms, PCR results not available. 
§For 38 farms, VNT results not available. 
Lack of Evidence for Zoonotic SBV
the issue of infectivity of birth materials. This lack of virus 
isolation implies that the number of persons in this study 
directly exposed to infectious virus particles from affected 
animals and/or birth material might be lower than assumed 
on the basis of the number of participants reporting this 
exposure. Nevertheless, the lack of seropositive samples 
indicates that the risk for infection through contact with 
contaminated materials, regardless of whether they contain 
infectious virus particles, is minimal. Therefore, given the 
high seroprevalence of SBV in affected herds (51 in online 
Technical Appendix), the lack of any evidence for zoonotic 
transmission from either the syndromic monitoring or this 
serologic study suggests that the public health risk for SBV 
given the current situation is absent or extremely low.
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